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Since the mid-1960s, particularly after the publi-
cation of the Brookings study in 1968, some im-
portant books, a large number of technical articles
and a plethora of popular comments have been
written on the state of the British economy, its
record of growth and its prospects. This note brings
together a selective summary of these diagnoses
and findings, together with some of my own
comments. Its scope is confined to a discussion
of the objectives and instruments of economic
policy in Britain, the structural consequences of
the over-riding preoccupation with short-run
management, the causes of low growth and pro-
ductivity in comparison with other industrial
countries and suggestions for improvement and
change. My concern shall be mainly with import-
ant issues rather than with data and documen-
tation.
In the past three decades, the dominant objective
of economic policy in Britain has been the main-
tenance of as high a level of economic activity
and employment as was compatible with the
balance in international payments. Until very
recently, price stability was not an object of policy
in the sense that anything much was done to
bring it about. Yet maintenance of employment
and the balance in external payments each require
separate policy instruments of adequate strength.
If different aspects of aggregate activity such as
price level and the rate of growth are also to be
controlled, more instruments again are required.
Not only have British policy-makers been pecu-
liarly obsessed with demand management but
also they have been singularly narrow in their
choice of instruments for the execution of this
policy. The most conspicuous instrument of stabil-
isation policy, especially between 1949 and 1967,
has been the frequent changes in fiscal policy. A
simple model of the economy consisting of highly
aggregated relationships, with almost no regard
for the composition of aggregate supply, formed
the basis of this policy. Once the future pattern
of government expenditure was determined, a
rate of tax consistent with immediate employment
objectives was chosen. The resultant deficit of the
public sector at the time of the budget provided
a simple calculation (à la Cripps, Godley and
Fetherston, 1974) of the balance of payments
deficit when the aggregate public expenditure
plan (separately calculated) remained unchanged
in relation to projected GDP. Although different
taxes and government outlays vary in their effects,
the possible trade-offs between alternative
changes in tax and expenditure policies do not
appear to have been explicitly recognised in
British budgetary practice.
In the general situation of inadequate reserves
which has characterised post-war Britain, fluc-
tuations in the balance of payments brought about
by frequent alterations in budgetary policy have
led to other compensatory policy changes. The
latter did not normally, however, operate directly
on the foreign balance. And on the whole they
had a destabiising effect on the economy (Dow,
Brookings), although this conclusion has been
contested by Worswick (in Cairncross, ed. 1970).
In a recent econometric study from the Depart-
ment of Applied Economics, University of Cam-
bridge, V. H. Woodward (in Barker, ed. 1976)
argues that there is "a strong presumption that
the past practico of attempting to stabilise em-
ployment in the short-run by fiscal policy largely
aimed at controlling consumer demand was
destabilising through its effects on the balance
of payments. The implication for budgetary policy
is that there should be greater stability in tax
yield in relation to public expenditure than in the
past".
Leaving aside the questions of definition and
measurement involved in the concepts of 'stabili-
sation' and 'destabilisation', the claim has often
been made that the British "stop-go" and the
uncertainty created by it has adversely affected
the growth of productive capacity. Mathew (in
Cairncross, ed. 1970) is, however, more doubtful
about the consequences of demand management
policy:
"The conclusions do not dispose of the hypoth-
esis that stop-go had a major influence in re-
tarding capital accumulation; indeed, such a
hypothesis is in principle hard to dispose of,
because of the difficulty of saying what would
have happened to business and labour attitudes
if growth had been perfectly steadya con-
tingency never experienced. Equally, however,
our conclusions do not give the hypothesis much
support".
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Nevertheless Woodward and his colleagues
(Barker, ed. 1976) are less agnostic and still main-
tain that the evidence supports the view that
"stop-go" policies have had adverse effects on
the underlying growth of productive capacity.
We have already noted the absence in British
budgetary practice of the explicit recognition of
trade-offs between alternative patterns of tax and
expenditure policies. The public expenditure plan-
nin.g model has been essentially oriented towards
aggregate demand and has failed to pay attention
to the composition of demand. Because of the
absence of any industrial disaggregation in the
policy model, the supply side implications of
planned public expenditure also could not be
fully understood. The composition of public
expenditure has changed greatly in the past
quarter century and has produced a big structural
shift in the allocation of labour force between
the different sectors of the economy. This is
shown in Table 1.
Table 1Growth of Employment
Source: Barker, 1976: 368
Between 1954 and 1963, the sectors of the
British economy producing "tradables" absorbed
1.13 mn. additional people; whereas between
1963 and 1973 the same sectors suffered a net
loss of about half as many jobs. Over the same
two periods, the additional jobs created in the
"non-tradable" sector were respectively 33,000
and 929,000. Barker and his colleagues have cal-
culated that if the growth of government employ-
ment in non-tradables over the period 1963-73
had been no faster than during the earlier period
(1954-63), there would probably have been no
decline in manufacturing employment if appro-
priate tax and exchange rate policies had been
pursued. "The underlying growth of the economy
might have been about 0.4 per cent fastera
significant amount".
In view of the trends in population and labour-
force growth, the lack of a labour reserve in
agriculture and restraints on immigration, the
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British authorities have become increasingly
aware of the need to free labour resources for
manufacturing. The introduction of Selective
Employment Tax (SET) on private services in
1965 is evidence of this. But since public expen-
diture planning was based on a demand-oriented
model of the economy, the contradictions between
the objectives of SET and the increasing labour
content of planned public expenditure were not
detected. Although generous investment incentives
were introduced (the effective tax rate on com-
panies in 1963-73 was less than in 1954-63), the
demand (and also the cash flow) was diverted
away from industry. If manufacturing industry,
so important for Britain's balance of payments,
were distinguished as a separate sector in the
Treasury's official model, the feedbacks between
the demand for manufactures and their supply
price and the consequence of increasing employ-
ment in the "non-tradable" sector on the growth
of the economy might have been observed and
allowed for.
At this stage a minor summing up is in order.
The main instrument for employment stabilisation
in the short run was frequent tax changes. Other
instruments of policy were used only in subsidiary
roles and none of these (certainly up to 1967)
operated, with any significant force, directly on
the foreign balance. Identification and use of
specific short-run objectives and targets did not
appear to have been explicitly attempted. Long-
run structural aspects of the economy were either
neglected or pursued in a manner in which differ-
ent instrumeits of policy conflicted with each
other and, probably contributed to fundamental
difficulties which had adready become conspicuous
by the time oil and commodity crises arrived.
A number of studies are available that have
looked into the comparative experience of many
Western industrial countries concerning shifts in
labour-force use in the post-war period. The
figures in Table 2 are taken from a recent and
provocatively interesting British study.
The table illustrates three main points. Firstly
the exhaustion of the labour-reserve in British
agriculture compared especially with Germany
and France. The latter were able to move 1.5
and 1.6 mn. workers respectively out of their
agricultural sectors between 1961 and 1974, more
than ten times the movement in the U.K. Secondly
that although employment in the services sector
has increased in all the major industrialised
countries, the percentage change in the ratio of
services to industrial employment (34 per cent
in 13 years) was much the largest in the U.K.
(000)
1954-1963 1963-1973
1. Manufacturing 354 -499
2. Other productive
industries and services 780 - 90
3. Government (excluding
trading services) 33 929
4. Total Employment 1167 340
972
704
-168
5200
3492
1708
4044
2453
-1591
3449
1932
-1517
13030
6730
6300
Employment
% Change
33.9
15.4
18.6
14.2
has risen drastically" and "an economy that will
not accept this exceedingly high natural rate of
unemployment will have extraordinary inflation
or draconian incomes policies" like Britain.
It would appear from these arguments that the
fact of too many non-producers (especially in
local government sector), taking away resources
from industrial investment and reducing the size
of the industrial sector, is being made to explain
all of Britain's past, present and future ills. The
suggestion that the distribution of the national
product governs the rate of growth is an old one.
However, Denison's calculations (Brookings
Study, 1968) for the period 1950 to 1962 did not
show that Britain had an output composition
which differed from what can be expected for an
economy of the British income level. Bacon and
Eltis' argument is based on 1961-74 data, but
they have not done the comparable accounting-
for-growth calculations of the kind that Denison
did. Although none of the large Western countries
has had a shift into public services as great as
Britain's between 1961 and 1974, the shift in
Sweden, Norway and Denmark has been even
faster and these countries have not suffered from
Britain's difficulties. The basic issue of low
growth in Britain may not be related to the high
level of public expenditure per se but, to some
other factors which were operative in Britain but
not in the US, Japan, Germany, France or the
Scandinavian economies. We shall revert to these
factors later.
Denison, in the study cited earlier, had concluded
that "per person employed, the UK had less
enterprise capital in the form of structures and
equipment than any of the other countries except
Italy". This was considered a contributory fac-
tor to lower levels of productivity in Britain.
However, the empirical basis of Denison's capital
estimates has been questioned. In Britain, the
volume of industrial capital that survived the
war, much of it built in the war, was high
relatively to most other European countries.
Since Denison disregarded survivals from the
years before 1946, he understated Britain's stock
of capital (especially that which is in the form of
structures).
Another argument sometimes put forward to
account for the slower rate of growth of pro-
ductivity in Britain relates to the relatively low
rate of industrial investment. Undoubtedly, the
stock of manufacturing capital in Britain has
grown more slowly than in the continental
countries. Nevertheless between 1954 and 1969
capital in manufacturing in the UK rose 50 per
cent faster than output. The significant feature of
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Thirdly, while industrial employment (comprising
mining, manufacturing, construction, gas, elec-
tricity and water) expanded in the U.S., France
and Japan, the number of industrial jobs in the
U.K. fell by 1.5 mn.a very significant amount.
Table 2Numbers of Civilians Employed by Sector
(000)
Industry Non-Industry Agriculture
less Agriculture
1961 11989 11624
UK 1974 10467 13596
-1512 + 1972
1961 21564 38982
USA 1974 26714 55730
±5150 --1-- 16748
1961 7132 7540
France 1974 8302 10409
+ 1170 + 2869
1961 12965 9824
West 1974 12737 11036
Germany 228 + 1212
1961 13460 18490
Japan 1974 19240 26040
+ 5780 ± 7550
Ratio of Non-industrial to Industrial
1961 1974
UK 0.970 1.299
USA 1.808 2.086
France 1.057 1.254
West Germany 0.758 0.866
Japan 1.374 1.353
Source: Bacon and Eltis, 1976
It is in these comparatively pronounced shifts in
the structure of employment and production that
Bacon and Eltis have sought an explanation of
the underlying deterioration in Britain's economic
performance and the succession of crises in the
1960s and 1970s.
"The explanation is that successive governments
have allowed large numbers of workers to
move out of industry and into various service
[authors intend non-traded service] occupa-
tions, where they still consume and invest
industrial products and produce none them-
selves; their needs have, therefore, been met at
the expense of the balance of payments, the
export surplus of manufactures, and investment
in industry itself, so the deterioration in the
balance of payments and Britain's rate of
growth can be explained. Once the effect of
taking away an increasing proportion of what
workers produce is recognised, the great accel-
eration of wage inflation becomes readily ex-
plicable, and the need for tougher and tougher
incomes policies (which other major economies
have not needed) to attempt to contain infla-
tion". (Bacon and Eltis, 1976; emphasis added).
These authors further argue that "the unemploy-
ment rate that is compatible with stable prices
the situation is not that industrial "investment
grew slowly but that output grew still more
slowly". "The fact is", observed Cairncross (1970),
"that the whole economy is permeated by the
comparative sluggishness reflected in the statistics
of productivity. All the figures seem to move up
more slowly in Britain: productivity, production,
consumption, exports, imports, investment and
any other significant aggregates. It is the totality
that needs explanation, not some individual
feature of it". Cairncross further observed that
"it is also difficult to treat a higher level of in-
dustrial investment as the key to higher produc-
tivity in Britain when the country is littered with
expensive equipment of the most modern type
that is simply not used at all: in the docks, in
printing establishments, and in many other
industries". He proposed that the question that
needs to be asked is not, 'How could more invest-
ment be encouraged', but, 'Why is it that more
investment is not worthwhile?'
Bacon and Eltis do address themselves to Cairn-
cross' question and their answer is that profits
are too low. Company profits (net of tax, capital
consumption and stock appreciation) have fallen
as a share of manufacturing output since 1964.
In manufacturing industry, they were 17.5 per
cent of value added in 1964, 7 per cent in 1970,
1971 and 1972 and only 3 per cent in 1973, out of
which dividends had to be paid and finance for
capital investment found. They argue that in
Britain, instead of the saving-investment mech-
anism, the main determinants of profit margins
have been government prices and incomes
policies, trade unions and foreign competition.
Although capital is becoming scarce, profit mar-
gins do not appear to be rising; and the scarce
capital cannot be spread out amongst more
workers by the adoption of labour-intensive
techniques because despite growing unemploy-
ment, labour is not cheap, so there is no incentive
for labour-intensive investment.
Another argument which is often advanced is that
Britain's rate of growth of output has been low
because labour constraints begin to operate early
in the expansionary phase, especially in critical
export sectors. The economy's full productive
potential therefore does not get fully exploited.
Although the main thrust of Bacon and Eltis'
explanation of the failure of the economy to
expand is that the industrial capacity has not
been available to meet the country's need for
goods during expansionary periods of the "stop-
go" cycle, the lack of labour mobilitybrought
about by government policiesis also an import-
ant element in their argument. While industry lost
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1.5 mn. workers between 1961 and 1974, public
sector employment expanded to absorb these
workers. The expansion of employment with
local authorities in this period was about 54 per
centnearly 1 mn. workers extra. The workers
taken on in recession were not available for in-
dustry in subsequent booms, so that shortage of
labour helped to bring these booms to an end
sooner than otherwise. In the following recession,
the government created still more jobs in the
public sector and these too became permanent.
The attraction of white collar jobs, the education
system, council housing rental arrangements,
mortgages, etc. may explain why people wish to
stay put. The expansion of public sector employ-
ment and the higher levels of unemployment
benefits explains why people are able to do so.
Some technologists (Bowden, 1976) have argued
that productivity in British industry is low because
old, worn-out tools are used. Among other things,
they pin the responsibility for this on the absence
of a replacement cost principle in accounting
practice (when prices have been rising) and on
the British tax practice until November, 1974,
of including any appreciation in the stock and
work-in-progress in taxable company profits.
This has in effect deprived industry of its ordinary
working capital by treating it as if it were re-
current income. In consequence of this and
relatively low rates of industrial investment, they
contend, British industry is dying of broken tools.
However, the evidence does not altogether sup-
port this hypothesis. In a detailed comparative
study (Bacon and Eltis, 1974) it was found that
the machine tools used in certain industries in
Britain were no older than in the United States,
and that the latter's lead in numerically controlled
machine tools was only three years. Nevertheless,
Britain had 50 per cent more men per machine
and got one-third less output per machine. In
another study (Central Policy Review Staff, 1975),
it was found that British assembly lines with the
same machines as European ones needed up to
twice as many hours to assemble cars. If these
results may be generalisedwhich is by no
means completely certainit appears that British
industrial productivity is low not because the
tools are old but because of over-manning and
downright inefficiency.
The causes of this inefficiency have been at-
tributed on the one hand to peculiarities of British
industrial relations and on the other to inadequate
training of business managers. It is claimed that
the fragmented nature of unions, craft unions
with shop floor bargaining and federation bargain-
ing, leads to waste of time and effort. Although
the number of hours lost per 1,000 hours of work
in the UK may be no higher than in countries
such as Germany and Sweden, the balkanised
British unions cause localised and partial strikes
which are far too disruptive of output: being
almost comparable in their impact on industrial
production and productivity to strategic bombing
during World War II. Although this strikes an
outsider as perhaps the dominant fact of British
industry, there is little that one can suggest to
disentangle Britain's complex labour relations
closely related as they are to the class conflict
entrenched in British society.
A number of other reasons are sometimes offered
for Britain's low level of industrial productivity.
These include a smaller proportion of engineers
and applied scientists in industry and relatively
poor remuneration of them vis à vis their re-
muneration in other comparable countries, and
inadequacy and misdirection of R and D ex-
pendituretoo much in the aircraft industry,
nuclear power and other defence related indus-
tries, relatively insignificant in other industries.
There has been on the whole less controversy
on these points, and the issues in question also
seem to be more amenable to policy action by
government and industry. Yet much more has
been said about them by British politicians,
industrialists and educators than has actually
been done.
The single most important need in Britain today
would seem to be for a medium and long-term
policy framework for industrial expansion and
structural change. The emphasis would have to
shift to the supply structure of the economy
rather than the usual obsession with aggregated
demand management for short-term often purely
political ends.
One particularly useful instrument for longer-run
policy would be an indicative plan on the French
or Japanese pattern, broken down by regions and
policies to encourage competitive industries to
relocate and expand in regions of declining em-
ployment, with adjustment assistance to industry
and labour being seen as an integral part of an
active industrial restructuring policy. The public
expenditure plan (not necessarily involving
smaller levels of public expenditure than hitherto),
the supply side implications of which for resource
allocation should be consistent with the objectives
of industrial expansion and structural changes,
should be integrated with the overall indicative
plan. In the context of North Sea oil, the time
would now seem right for an initiative towards
a long-term policy framework in Britain.
North Sea oil should also afford Britain the
opportunity to disentagle the instruments for the
short-term control of domestic activity from those
needed for correcting the balance of payments.
It would be worthwhile to experiment with the
idea of extensive retraining and rehousing (on the
Swedish pattern) of labour in the downswing of
the cycle and not to offer jobs to the industrial
unemployed in occupations from which they
would not want to come out to industry in the
upswing. The French, and particularly the Ger-
mans, have enjoyed immense benefits conferred
by the mobility of their labour forces made pos-
sible by the labour-reserve in agriculture and the
presence of very mobile foreign workers.
Retraining of labour in times of cyclical unem-
ployment should be combined with part-time
work on public projects or local construction
projects, preferably with short gestation periods
and with minimal effects on the balance of pay-
ments. This approach to the alleviation of short-
run fluctuations in unemployment would be a
good partial substitute for the usual unemploy-
ment benefits and too frequent changes in budge-
tary policy.
Nevertheless, the circumstances are bound to
arise when it will be desirable to change tax in-
cidence in relation to planned public expenditure.
To take care of adverse movements in terms of
trade of a more lasting nature, tax changes or
public expenditure cuts would have to be made
in such a way as to transfer resources into the
balance of payments when it does not seem
feasible to maintain levels of consumption by
borrowing; and the long-term (indicative) plan
should be fashioned in such a way as to provide
the structural context for the stimulation and
redirection of investment into exporting and other
productive activities in the short-run,
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